Consumer debt played a central role in creating the U.S. housing bubble, the ensuing housing downturn, and the Great Recession, and it has been blamed as a factor in the weak subsequent recovery as well. This paper uses micro-level data to decompose consumer debt dynamics by separating the actions of consumer debt increasers and decreasers, and then further decomposing movements into percentage and size margins among the increasers and decreasers. We view such a decomposition as informative for macroeconomic models featuring a central role for consumer debt. Using this framework, we show that variations in borrowing activity among the increasers explain four times as much of the total variation in consumer debt as variations among the decreasers who are shedding debt, whether through paydowns or defaults. We also provide micro-level evidence of a sharp decline in the percentage of increasers during the financial crisis that is qualitatively consistent with a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and evidence of a cycle in the average size of debt changes among the increasers that is related to rising collateral values pre-crisis coupled with additional financial frictions after the crisis.
I. Introduction
Consumer debt played a central role in creating the U.S. housing bubble, the ensuing housing downturn, and the Great Recession, and it has been blamed as a factor in the weak subsequent recovery as well. Recent works by Mian and Sufi (2009 , 2010 , 2011a , Mian et al. (2013) , Midrigan and Philippon (2011) , and Dynan (2012) find a significant connection between overleveraged households and economic weakness. Debt also plays a role in papers that focus on the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates: in a world in which the zero lower bound becomes a binding constraint, less-leveraged households may not step up their borrowing to make up for deleveraging on the part of other agents, as in Hall (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) ; the results in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) are similar.
Recent papers also attempt to make some headway in understanding household debt dynamics. Bhutta (2012) identifies both weak demand and elevated numbers of defaults as key drivers of declines in household mortgage debt since the Great Recession. Haughwout et al. (2012) also identify weak borrowing and paying down existing liabilities as important sources of consumer debt reduction. Mian and Sufi (2011b) find that house price appreciation during the housing bubble led to an increase in borrowing, especially among households with relatively high credit card utilization rates and low credit scores. This paper seeks to more formally quantify the forces driving consumer debt dynamics using a nationally representative source of micro-level data on consumers' outstanding debt balances that spans 1999Q1 through 2013Q4. Our framework separates "increasers"-consumers who increase their debt balances-from the "decreasers" whose debt balances decline. We then further decompose the contributions coming from each group into the percentage of consumers increasing or decreasing their debt and the average size of the changes 3 in debt they made. In essence, such a division bears similarities to extensive and intensive margins, respectively.
We show that the actions of the increasers have been highly correlated with changes in consumer debt, even for periods dominated by consumer deleveraging. Variance decompositions show that variations in borrowing activity among the increasers have historically explained at least four times as much of the total variation in consumer debt as variations among the decreasers who are shedding debt, whether through paydowns or defaults. Among the increasers, we find that movements in our size measure explain about twice the variance as movements in the percentage measure, but even the latter are significantly more important than the cumulative actions of the decreasers. Applying these results to the recent past suggests that consumer deleveraging following the Great Recession can be interpreted as a story about consumer "non-leveraging" despite the presence of historically low interest rates.
Our empirical findings are relevant for a range of macroeconomic models that incorporate consumer debt dynamics. Beyond the variance decompositions showing the importance of the increasers, we provide qualitative and quantitative evidence of time variation in the percentage of increasers. The time series evidence on the percentage of increasers is inconsistent with the calibrations from several recent models that feature only two representative agents, an impatient borrower and a patient lender: the percentage of increasers was less than 50 percent during the housing boom and fell further during the financial crisis, consistent with a wider range of heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we document a sharp decline in the percentage of increasers during the financial crisis and low levels during the subsequent slow recovery that provides micro-founded evidence for the intuition of a binding zero lower bound on nominal 4 interest rates, during which time less leveraged agents fail to step up borrowing to offset deleveraging by others.
One concern is whether tight lending standards may have been the primary reason for such a failure rather than the zero lower bound on nominal rates. To address this issue, we rely on the fact that low credit scores are often interpreted as being correlated with borrowing constraints, as in Gross and Souleles (2002) . The data show that consumers who were perceived as being among the safest credits-and therefore should have been less subject to tight credit conditions-failed to ramp up borrowing in the wake of the financial crisis, when short-term nominal rates were constrained by the zero lower bound, consistent with interest rates remaining "too high" to incentivize this least-borrowing-constrained group from leveraging up. But more generally, the deleveraging process has been led by historically weak borrowing activity from the consumers in the middle of the risk distribution who had previously been responsible for the majority of the leveraging during the housing bubble phase.
Finally, we document rapid growth in the average size of debt changes among the increasers during the housing bubble and a steep decline in the size measure during the housing bust. This pattern is again consistent with a binding zero lower bound on nominal rates, in which even lower rates could have incentivized those agents who were borrowing to take on additional leverage while keeping their debt servicing burden unchanged. But fully explaining the complete cycle requires some combination of a collateral channel and additional financial frictions: while house prices and size dynamics are tightly correlated before the crisis, consistent with Mian and Sufi (2011b) , movements in collateral values alone cannot account for the postcrisis behavior of the size measure.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III presents our framework for decomposing consumer debt dynamics. Section IV presents regression and variance decomposition results. Section V shows the robustness of our results to alternative decompositions, and Section VI extends the results to consider a measure of household liquidity constraints. Section VII discusses how our results relate to the recent literature, and Section VIII concludes.
II. Consumer Debt Data
Studying consumer debt has historically been limited by a lack of high-quality, high-frequency, micro-level panel data. We use the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Consumer Credit Panel (FRBNY-CCP) to help fill this void. The FRBNY-CCP is a nationally representative, ongoing panel dataset that focuses on consumers' debts using a five percent random sample of all individual credit records maintained by Equifax, one of the major credit reporting agencies.
This quarterly dataset begins in 1999 and contains information on all aspects of a consumer's outstanding debts-including outstanding balances, past-due balances, and delinquency statusfor all forms of debt. We randomly subsample five percent of consumers in the FRBNY-CCP for ease of analysis, allowing us to follow approximately 515,000 consumers on average in every quarter. Along with detailed information on an individual's outstanding debts, the FRBNY-CCP contains information on each individual's birth year, state, county and zip code of residence, and an Equifax risk score. Equifax risk scores are meant to predict the likelihood of a severe delinquency within the next 24 months; scores range from 280 to 850, with lower scores representing greater perceived credit risk-that is, a higher likelihood of a severe delinquency.
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The FRBNY-CCP does not contain personally identifying information such as date of birth, Social Security number, or street address of residence. For additional information on the FRBNY-CCP, see Lee and Van der Klaauw (2010) .
Our measure of consumer debt includes borrowing in five categories: first mortgage; home equity; auto; credit card; and other.
1 Due to difficulties in matching borrowers with student loans over time, we exclude student loans from the analysis. In calculating a consumer's total outstanding debt, jointly held accounts are given a weight of one half.
The combination of breadth and depth makes the FRBNY-CCP ideal for studying consumer debt dynamics. The representative nature of the FRBNY-CCP allows for computing aggregate debt statistics at the national level. At the individual level, the FRBNY-CCP employs unique identifiers so that individuals can be tracked over multiple quarters and their borrowing histories reconstructed. Observing these borrowing histories can help determine which consumers play an important role in driving consumer debt dynamics.
Unfortunately, one drawback to the FRBNY-CCP as a source of consumer debt records is that the records can contain noise. For example, refinancing can be recorded as a payoff in one quarter and a new balance in a later quarter, or accounts can be transferred or sold and the closing of the old account and opening of a new account may not perfectly coincide; see Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) . In addition, the number of consumers varies over time due to entry, exit, or coding errors. It is not always possible to ascertain which explanation holds: some consumers temporarily disappear from the sample only to reappear later, often with a different level of debt.
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On average, 0.9% of consumers disappear from the sample from one quarter to the next; of these, 26.9% reenter at some point in the future through the end of the sample, and 47.2% of those reenter with a different level of debt than they owed when they left.
Our analysis focuses on changes in debt over year-ago levels. Using four-quarter changes helps to mitigate some of the noise in the high frequency quarterly data. In addition, four-quarter changes abstract from predictable variations in debt over the calendar year from seasonal effects, which are typically omitted or removed in most macroeconomic analyses.
III. Decomposing Consumer Debt Dynamics
The level of total consumer debt D t is the sum of all individual consumers' debt holdings d i,t in that quarter,
where the total number of consumers, N t , varies with time. Given the representative nature of our panel, multiplying the sampled level of total debt and the sampled number of consumers by a constant multiplicative scaling factor η=400 produces the corresponding aggregate totals. In most of what follows, however, these scaling factors drop out.
Our approach focuses on nominal consumer debt. One rationale for this focus is the lack of a single clear method to deflate consumer debt. Deflating by a measure of consumer prices compares growth in debt to movements in the prices of a broader basket of goods and services; alternatively, deflating by nominal disposable personal income can be useful for illustrating the servicing capability of the debt burden. A second rationale for focusing on nominal debt is that the available data for our analysis are not so long that deflating nominal debt becomes absolutely 8 necessary. But finally and perhaps most importantly, the focus on nominal debt allows for a closer examination of the individual consumer's choice to increase or decrease debt, notwithstanding movements in aggregate variables; hence, individual decisions are preserved.
For example, under the approach of deflating nominal debt by the price level, a small increase in an individual's debt level that is less than the growth in consumer prices would appear as a decrease in debt, which is at odds with the individual's choice problem.
We consider two measures of movements in consumer debt. The first measure is the change in debt per person over its year-ago level:
The second measure is the growth of consumer debt over its year-ago level:
While the statistics Δ t and g t are straightforward, aggregating from individuals poses challenges. As noted above, a small number of individual consumers enter, exit, and "disappear" from the panel only to "reappear" later, which means that treating missing consumers as having zero debt is sometimes but not always correct. In what follows, we only follow individuals who were present at both the beginning of each four-quarter window (t−4) and the end of the fourquarter window (t), ignoring their status in between. Over a given four-quarter window, there are ( , 4) tt N  such consumers. The total level of consumer debt among those consumers at the end of the window is ( , 4) Because individuals need to be present at both the beginning and the end of each window, the level of total debt derived from this window construct will necessarily be less than or equal to debt derived from the entire sample; i.e., ( , 4 Total aggregate debt at time t is the sum of the debt levels of the mutually exclusive groups, ( , 4) ,
. Taking into account this relationship and the definitions above, the change in total consumer debt per person in equation (4) be the inverted level of debt per person at the start of the window, the growth of consumer debt can be written as
Detailed Decompositions
We can provide additional detail to the decompositions by differentiating consumers based on whether they were holding positive debt balances at the beginning or the end of the window under consideration. 5 We denote with superscripts the beginning and ending debt levels among groups of consumers. The number of increasers is the sum of the number of consumers whose individual debt levels went from zero at time t−4 to a positive level at time t (
and the number of consumers whose debts went from a positive level to a greater positive level 12 over the same time span ( ( , 4)
Similarly, the number of decreasers is the sum of the number of consumers who had positive debt in time t−4 and zero debt in period t, and the number of consumers whose debts went from a positive level to a smaller positive level over the same time span:
The change in consumer debt per person can then be written as the sum of the contributions coming from the mutually exclusive groups of increasers (zero to positive, and positive to greater positive) and decreasers (positive to zero, and positive to smaller positive). In turn, each group's contribution can be decomposed into percentage and size measures: 
IV. Who Drives Consumer Debt?
We study consumer debt dynamics through a variety of exercises. We begin by considering correlations and simple graphical and statistical relationships between the aggregate variables of interest (the change in debt per person and the growth in consumer debt) and our constructed percentage and size measures. While these analyses provide suggestive evidence on consumer debt dynamics, variance decompositions allow us to quantify the key drivers of consumer debt.
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In these exercises, we show that variations in borrowing activity among the increasers have typically explained at least four times as much of the total variation in consumer debt as variations among the decreasers who are shedding debt, whether through paydowns or defaults.
Correlations
As a first pass, we consider correlations between our constructed measures and aggregate debt movements. Table 1 looks at correlates of the change in debt per person (Δ t ) and the growth of consumer debt (g t ), based on the relationships derived in equations (6) and (7). In the simplest versions, the contributions coming from the increasers tend to be more highly correlated than the contributions coming from the decreasers with both the change in debt per person (0.94 versus 0.71, respectively) and the growth of consumer debt (0.84 versus 0.81, respectively). After splitting the contribution terms into their percentage and size components, the percentage measures in most cases exhibit higher correlations than the size measures, but the strength of the correlations does not uniformly favor either the increasers or decreasers.
We next look at the correlations coming from the more detailed breakdowns in equations (8) and (9). Table 2 shows that correlations between the two groups of increasers' contributions We interpret these correlations as offering some support for the notion that the behavior of the increasers is a key driver of consumer debt dynamics.
Regression Results
We build upon these correlations and consider simple regressions to explain changes in debt per person and growth of consumer debt. Each regression takes the form (10)
where the dependent variable y t is either the change in debt per person (Δ t ) or the growth of consumer debt (g t ), the explanatory variable x t is one of the percentage or size measures from the earlier derivations, and e t is an error term. We consider each explanatory variable individually to assess its ability to explain movements in consumer debt. Table 3 presents the adjusted R-squared statistics from each regression as a summary of fit; we omit the coefficient estimates, as we do not find them to be informative. Among the We use the regression results in creating Figure 2 , which plots our constructed percentage and size measures. To maximize compatibility, we use the estimated regression coefficients from equation (10) to scale the right axis for each measure, and we plot the change in total consumer debt or the percentage growth of total consumer debt on the left axis.
Visually, the percentages of increasers and decreasers tend to track aggregate consumer debt growth well, measured using either growth rates or average changes. If one period stands out, it is the very tight connection between the percent change in debt and the percentage of increasers from the end of 2007 onward. Looking at key trends, the percentage of increasers was flat-to-declining during the housing bubble, plunged during the Great Recession, and remained at low levels in the subsequent recovery. Meanwhile, the housing bubble run-up was more visible in the average size of debt changes among the increasers: this size measure steadily climbed during the bubble phase, and then declined sharply during the recession. The average size of debt changes among the decreasers provides only limited visual evidence of a sudden increase in defaults and debt paydowns following the bubble. We discuss the significance of these findings and their implications for recent attempts to model consumer debt dynamics in Section VII.
Variance Decompositions
As a more formal exercise, we employ variance decompositions to explain movements in consumer debt. We focus on explaining the variance of the change in debt per person, var( )
We find roughly similar results when explaining the variance of the growth rate of total consumer debt using equation (7). 6 We consider four different decompositions.
The first decomposition uses the variance of the contributions from the increasers, Table 4 shows that 61% of the variance is explained directly by the increasers, while only 14% is explained directly by the decreasers; the remainder is attributed to the covariance term, which incorporates a range of factors. On this basis, the variations in borrowing activity among the increasers explain four times as much of the total variation in consumer debt changes as variations among the decreasers. Even if the entire covariance term could be attributed to decreasers, the increasers would nonetheless continue to dominate consumer debt movements.
Column (2) uses a first-order Taylor series expansion of equation (6) to account for the variance of changes in consumer debt. 7 As we add more terms to the decomposition, the number and importance of the covariance terms grow. Nevertheless, we continue to obtain similar results: the direct variance terms coming from the increasers now explain about half of the total variance, while the direct variance terms coming from the decreasers now explain about 10%, for a five-to-one ratio.
Column (3) splits increasers and decreasers into two groups, depending on whether the consumers began or ended the four-quarter window with zero debt, respectively. In this decomposition, debt changes among consumers who began or ended with zero debt explain essentially none of the variance in changes in consumer debt. Instead, variation in debt changes among the increasers who go from a positive debt level to a greater positive level explains the vast majority, in roughly a six-to-one ratio.
Finally, column (4) presents results from a variance decomposition using a first-order expansion of equation (8). With a large number of terms in the original equation, there are a very large number of covariance terms, and these terms collectively explain a considerable share of the total variance. Nevertheless, even with this fine level of granularity, the increasers whose debt went from a positive to a greater positive level continue to directly explain about six times more of the variation in total consumer debt changes than the decreasers.
Among the increasers, the variance share explained by the average size measures is about twice that of the percentage measures, and both are far larger than the corresponding measures from decreasers. These facts accord with the graphical evidence from Figure 2 , which showed 7 Letting x be the steady state value of x and defining ˆt t x x x , equation (6) remained at low levels in the recovery. 8 We discuss interpretations of this evidence below.
The variance decompositions offer clear evidence of the importance of the increasers in explaining movements in consumer debt over the last decade and a half.
V. Robustness to Alternative Decompositions
For the sake of robustness, we consider three variants to the results presented above. We first consider an alternative derivation of the growth rate of consumer debt that does not rely on the percentage and size measures. We next change the time period under consideration to focus on consumer debt dynamics after the peak of the housing bubble in 2006; that is, we focus on the period of consumer deleveraging. Finally, we exclude housing-related debt to assess the degree to which our results are directly related to the housing bubble. All three cases provide further evidence of the key role of the increasers in driving consumer debt dynamics.
Robustness: Decomposing the Growth Rate of Consumer Debt
Alternative decompositions of the growth rate of consumer debt are possible beyond equation Table 5 presents results from the four alternative variance decompositions. Columns (1) and (3) show that the increasers alone explain more than 100% of the variance in the growth of consumer debt, var( ) t g , and more than ten times the variance explained by the decreasers.
Obviously, the covariance terms in these cases are highly negative, which complicates the interpretation. Columns (2) and (4) are variance decompositions derived from first-order expansions of equations (11) and (12), respectively, and they tell essentially similar stories:
variation among the increasers dictates the vast majority of consumer debt dynamics.
We do not find the share measures , Nevertheless, this alternative approach provides a sensitivity check and largely confirms our initial results that the increasers dominate consumer debt dynamics.
Robustness: Crisis and Recovery Period
The above results consider the entire sample of the FRBNY-CCP, which spans 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. One possibility is that these decompositions primarily capture the run-up in debt during the housing bubble, when consumers were rapidly increasing outstanding mortgage debt. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 6 show that variations in debt changes among increasers explain more than half of the variance of the change in debt per person, and variation among the increasers explains more than ten times the variation explained by the decreasers. Detailed decompositions in columns (2) and (4) produce broadly similar results and ratios. The variance terms in the decompositions using the shorter sample tend to explain a smaller share of the total variance than when considering the entire sample. Nevertheless, our main result holds: increasers continued to drive consumer debt dynamics after 2007.
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Robustness: Non-Housing Debt
The primary analysis in this paper considers a broad definition of debt, including first mortgage debt, home equity borrowing, auto debt, credit card debt, and other debt but excludes student loans. Together, first mortgage debt and home equity borrowing account for over 80% of total debt on average during out sample. In an effort to remove direct effects of the housing bubble and bust on consumer debt dynamics, we consider a variance decomposition that excludes housing-related debt in the form of first mortgage debt and home equity borrowing.
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Columns (5) and (7) in Table 6 show that the contributions from the increasers explain the majority of the total variance in changes in non-housing debt per person and more than three times the contributions from the decreasers. Columns (6) and (8) tell a roughly similar story. In one break from the earlier results, fluctuations in the percentage of increasers play a greater role than fluctuations in the average size of borrowing among the increasers in explaining nonhousing debt movements. Putting these results together with those presented earlier in the paper, increasers are better able to explain aggregate movements in debt over time across types of debt.
VI. Extension: Consumer Debt Dynamics and Consumer Risk
Our framework for distinguishing between increasers and decreasers and examining the percentage and size margins within each group allows us to examine other questions, such as how consumers' perceived riskiness has affected consumer debt dynamics. Low credit scores are often interpreted as being correlated with borrowing constraints, as in Gross and Souleles 22 (2002) , potentially reflecting borrowers' underlying behavioral characteristics related to selfcontrol, and a number of macroeconomic models featuring consumer debt employ heterogeneous discount rates to derive a segment of the population that owes debt in equilibrium (e.g., Hall 2011, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012, Justiniano et al. 2013) . 12 One popular narrative to explain the housing bubble and bust is that the gradual easing of underwriting standards fueled the housing bubble, and the sudden tightening of standards proved the impetus for the housing downturn and financial crisis (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2009, Favara and Imbs 2012; a similar mechanism is at play in Geanakoplos 2010). We take an agnostic view of the causes of the boom and bust to simply let the data speak.
To do so, we group individual consumers into quartiles based on their Equifax risk scores as indicated above graphically, there are strong covariance contributions that we do not report.
The first three risk quartiles explain relatively more of the total variance than the fourth quartile.
Looking at increasers and decreasers in column (2), decreasers in the first risk quartile have a larger influence on changes in consumer debt than increasers, but the results are reversed in the second and third risk quartiles. Column (3) shows results from the full variance decomposition.
With a very large number of terms in the decomposition, the share of the variance explained by any single variable is small. Nevertheless, the results show that default activity as captured by the average size of debt changes among decreasers in the first quartile explains less of the total variance than the size variables among increasers in the second and third quartiles.
VII. Discussion
Our results highlight the importance of properly capturing the actions of the increasers for matching aggregate consumer debt dynamics. Our quantitative approach shows that even periods of consumer deleveraging are mostly dominated by weak borrowing activity rather than high levels of defaults. Beyond this finding, our empirics are broadly relevant for the new and growing literature on the relationship between consumer debt and the macroeconomy.
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First, we use high-frequency, micro-level evidence to document the percentage of consumers who increase their debts, along with qualitative and quantitative evidence of time variation in the percentage of increasers, and we show that capturing this time variation is important in accounting for consumer debt dynamics. A number of recent papers on consumer debt have motivated a household borrowing channel by separating households into "patient" and "impatient" (or "unconstrained" and "constrained") types based on differing discount factors, with identical households in each type to produce two representative agents. The relative shares of the two agents have then been calibrated using moments from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (e.g., Hall 2011 , Justiniano et al. 2013 ) to derive a time-invariant segment of the model population that is borrowing constrained, with the share of constrained consumers calibrated to be greater than 50%. 13 A period of rising debt in these models would coincide with additional borrowing by all the constrained consumers. By contrast, Figure 2 shows that the percentage of increasers in our sample remained below 50% even during the housing boom and fell below 30%
immediately following the recession. 14 Models with only two representative agents cannot match this time series evidence. Thus, matching the quantitative behavior of the percentage of increasers requires additional heterogeneity in either discount rates or some other mechanism.
15
Notwithstanding these quantitative shortcomings, we view our results on the sharp decline in the percentage of increasers around the financial crisis as providing micro-founded empirical evidence of the types of behaviors induced by a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. As set out in papers such as Hall (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) , the 26 presence of the zero lower bound prevents nominal interest rates from falling far enough to incentivize less-leveraged agents to increase borrowing to offset deleveraging by others, which can take the form of a decrease in the number of net borrowers. Notably, we document in Figure   3 that even the fourth risk score quartile-which contains the least risky consumers with the highest scores-was deleveraging in the aggregate following the financial crisis, and Figure 4(a) shows that the fraction of increasers in this quartile was essentially unchanged before and after the crisis. A larger decline in nominal rates should have induced additional borrowing by this group because their position in the risk score distribution would have made them less subject to the tight credit conditions that impeded other potential borrowers after credit conditions tightened post-crisis. Hence, their lack of leveraging can be viewed as evidence of interest rates remaining "too high."
Finally, we document a strong cycle in the size of debt changes among the increasers, featuring rapid growth in our size measure during the housing bubble and a steep decline in the size measure during the housing bust (see Figure 2(d) ). The decompositions find that variations in the average size of debt changes among the increasers are about twice as important as variations in the percentage of increasers in explaining the total variance in consumer debt.
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The decline in the average size of changes among the increasers around the financial crisis can be partly interpreted through the prism of the binding zero lower bound post-crisis: with even lower rates, more agents could have been incentivized to increase borrowing as described above, and those who did could have borrowed to a greater extent by taking on additional leverage while keeping their debt servicing burden unchanged.
But fully explaining the cycle requires an important role for a collateral channel. Using housing supply elasticities as an instrument, Mian and Sufi (2011b) Because we separate increasers from decreasers, the average size of debt changes among the increasers that we document is potentially a purer reflection of house price dynamics during both the boom and bust given the large role played by housing debt in our measure of total debt excluding student loans, and we indeed find a contemporaneous correlation of about 0.9 between national home prices and the average size of debt changes among increasers over the entire time span. 17 Justiniano et al. (2013) propose a DSGE model in which house prices drive a collateral channel; e.g., as house prices increase, collateral values appreciate, facilitating more borrowing. Over the entire cycle, the micro data are broadly consistent with this collateral channel among the increasers.
However, the very strong correlation between the series breaks down around the financial crisis. We estimate a model for the average size of debt changes among the increasers , 
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find that the average size of debt changes among the increasers (the blue line in Figure 5 ) fell by more than would have been predicted by the decline in home prices and remained low even when home prices rebounded (the dashed line in Figure 5 ).
18 Thus, movements in collateral prices alone cannot explain the post-crisis period, which may help to explain why the preferred model simulations in Justiniano et al. (2013) fail to exhibit a binding zero lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates as in the data. The post-crisis period provides additional scope for frictions such as increases in collateral requirements and lower leverage ratios, as in the leverage cycle proposed by Geanakoplos (2010) .
VIII. Conclusion
Recent work has emphasized the role of consumer debt in both the housing bubble and bust and stressed the broad implications of consumer debt for macroeconomic performance. We present a new framework for decomposing consumer debt dynamics using data at the micro level by separating the actions of increasers and decreasers, and we then further decompose movements into percentage and size margins among the increasers and decreasers.
We find this framework useful for informing macroeconomic models that feature a role for consumer debt. First, we show that the actions of the increasers dominate consumer debt dynamics: the variations in borrowing activity among the increasers explain four times as much of the total variation in consumer debt as variations among the decreasers. This result holds even for the recent period of consumer deleveraging, which rather than being dominated by consumer defaults might better be termed a period of "non-leveraging. Notes: The remainder of the total variance within a given column is explained by covariance terms that are not reported. Variance terms explaining less than 1% of the total variance in the decomposition in column (3) 
